[Tuberculosis Infection Control & Hygiene - Recommendations of the DZK]. / Infektionsprävention & Hygiene bei Tuberkulose ­ Empfehlungen des DZK.

Preventing the spread of the disease is an essential goal in the care and treatment of tuberculosis. In addition to early diagnosis and effective therapies, isolation of infectious patients and adequate hygiene measures are of particular importance for infection prevention. The present recommendations replace the previous recommendations "tuberculosis infection control" from 2012 and take into account the current national and international recommendations and as well as new scientific findings. After a description of the infection and the transmission pathways, the necessary prevention and hygiene measures in health care facilities are comprehensively presented. Since the last revision of the recommendations on infection prevention, international recommendations and the KRINKO recommendation on ending isolation have been changed. In accordance with this, under certain conditions in the case of sensitive tuberculosis, de-isolation in health care facilities can take place after 14 days without taking the sputum findings into account. The second part of the recommendations explains in detail the measures to be taken in special situations and areas, such as general practitioners, ambulance services and care facilities. Here, the recommendations on respiratory protection have been simplified; for staff, an FFP2 mask is now generally considered sufficient.

[Generation of an FAQ page on Dealing with Multi-resistant Pathogens at the Interface of Veterinary and Human Medicine]. / Konzeption von Frequently Asked Questions zum Umgang mit multiresistenten Erregern an der Schnittstelle von Veterinär- und Humanmedizin.

OBJECTIVE: The aims of this work were the systematic and evidence-based generation and answering of frequently asked questions (FAQ) regarding contact with multi-drug resistant pathogens (MDR) including aspects of veterinary and human medicine for the public health service (PHS) and the general population. METHODS: In order to determine the information needs of the population, guideline-based expert interviews with veterinarians and physicians were conducted in five surveys. In addition, information about the project was published in two journals and the participants were asked to submit open questions from their daily routine with respect to MDR. The results of the interviews and project calls were divided into categories, and frequently mentioned topics were prepared as FAQ. For answering the FAQ, a systematic literature search in the databases Pubmed and Wiley Online Library was conducted. A panel of experts subsequently evaluated the FAQ drafts, and a consensus was reached in case of conflicting results. Thereafter, the FAQs were evaluated by physicians and veterinarians of the PHS. RESULTS: Nine FAQs were generated in total. In addition to a survey of the current state of research, recommendations were made for private dealing with non-medical contact with MDR at the interface of human and veterinary medicine. The recommendations depended on the respective setting and the type of animal contact. Different recommendations were given for the handling of MDR in pets, farm animals, animals in communal facilities and animals used for animal-assisted therapies. The most important measure against the spread of MDR between humans and animals proved to be regular and careful handwashing. CONCLUSION: Mixed methods were used to ensure the quality of the FAQ. Limitations were found in the literature search. Not all submitted questions could be answered with the available literature. In the future, the FAQ should be continuously updated and extended.

Source attribution of community-acquired cases of Legionnaires' disease-results from the German LeTriWa study; Berlin, 2016-2019.

INTRODUCTION: Sources of infection of most cases of community-acquired Legionnaires' disease (CALD) are unknown. OBJECTIVE: Identification of sources of infection of CALD. SETTING: Berlin; December 2016-May 2019. PARTICIPANTS: Adult cases of CALD reported to district health authorities and consenting to the study; age and hospital matched controls. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Percentage of cases of CALD with attributed source of infection. METHODS: Analysis of secondary patient samples for monoclonal antibody (MAb) type (and sequence type); questionnaire-based interviews, analysis of standard household water samples for Legionella concentration followed by MAb (and sequence) typing of Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 (Lp1) isolates; among cases taking of additional water samples to identify the infectious source as appropriate; recruitment of control persons for comparison of exposure history and Legionella in standard household water samples. For each case an appraisal matrix was filled in to attribute any of three source types (external (non-residence) source, residential non-drinking water (RnDW) source (not directly from drinking water outlet), residential drinking water (RDW) as source) using three evidence types (microbiological results, cluster evidence, analytical-comparative evidence (using added information from controls)). RESULTS: Inclusion of 111 study cases and 202 controls. Median age of cases was 67 years (range 25-93 years), 74 (67%) were male. Among 65 patients with urine typable for MAb type we found a MAb 3/1-positive strain in all of them. Compared to controls being a case was not associated with a higher Legionella concentration in standard household water samples, however, the presence of a MAb 3/1-positive strain was significantly associated (odds ratio (OR) = 4.9, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.7 to 11). Thus, a source was attributed by microbiological evidence if it contained a MAb 3/1-positive strain. A source was attributed by cluster evidence if at least two cases were exposed to the same source. Statistically significant general source types were attributed by calculating the population attributable risk (analytical-comparative evidence). We identified an external source in 16 (14%) cases, and RDW as source in 28 (25%). Wearing inadequately disinfected dentures was the only RnDW source significantly associated with cases (OR = 3.2, 95% CI 1.3 to 7.8) and led to an additional 8% of cases with source attribution, for a total of 48% of cases attributed. CONCLUSION: Using the appraisal matrix we attributed almost half of all cases of CALD to an infectious source, predominantly RDW. Risk for LD seems to be conferred primarily by the type of Legionella rather than the amount. Dentures as a new infectious source needs further, in particular, integrated microbiological, molecular and epidemiological confirmation.

Pyoderma outbreak among kindergarten families: Association with a Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL)-producing S. aureus strain.

OBJECTIVES: We report on an outbreak of skin and soft tissue infections (SSTI) among kindergarten families. We analyzed the transmission route and aimed to control the outbreak. METHODS: The transmission route was investigated by nasal screening for Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL)-producing Staphylococcus aureus (PVL-SA), subsequent microbiological investigation including whole genome sequencing and a questionnaire-based analysis of epidemiological information. The control measures included distribution of outbreak information to all individuals at risk and implementation of a Staphylococcus aureus decontamination protocol. RESULTS: Individuals from 7 of 19 families were either colonized or showed signs of SSTI such as massive abscesses or eye lid infections. We found 10 PVL-SA isolates in 9 individuals. In the WGS-analysis all isolates were found identical with a maximum of 17 allele difference. The clones were methicillin-susceptible but cotrimoxazole resistant. In comparison to PVL-SAs from an international strain collection, the outbreak clone showed close genetical relatedness to PVL-SAs from a non-European country. The questionnaire results showed frequent travels of one family to this area. The results also demonstrated likely transmission via direct contact between families. After initiation of Staphylococcus aureus decontamination no further case was detected. CONCLUSIONS: Our outbreak investigation showed the introduction of a PVL-SA strain into a kindergarten likely as a result of international travel and further transmission by direct contact. The implementation of a Staphylococcus aureus decontamination protocol was able to control the outbreak.